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Abstract: Recent theories of compliance predict that, apart from utilitarian 
considerations, individual decisions to respect or break the law account for virtuous 
motives and non-utilitarian willingness to promote the social good. We test whether 
empirical evidence supports these theories by collecting data on cyclists’ decisions 
to ignore a red traffic light in a natural setting. We consider different situations 
where non-compliance is costly, but without risk, and where material deterrence 
incentives from legal sanctions remain constant. The only difference between the 
situations lies in who is observing the cyclists’ decision at the traffic light at the 
intersection of a footpath with the cycle track. We find that about 68% of cyclists 
ignore the red traffic light when there is the opportunity to do so. This frequency 
does not change substantially when adult bystanders are observing at the pedestrian 
traffic light. Interestingly, the violation frequency drops to about 10% when 
children are present. Robustness checks rule out the alternative explanations that 
this change is driven by concerns for children's unpredictable actions, or by the 
simultaneous presence of other adult bystanders. In a vignette study, we 
additionally dissect the cyclists’ motives for being compliant. Results suggest a 
“role-model effect” on compliance. When asked, the majority of participants report 
that the willingness to educate and be a good example is the most important reason 
for their decision to abide by the law, hence supporting the empirical observation 
that promoting the social good can be an important non-utilitarian motive of 
compliance decisions. 
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1	 Introduction	
Understanding the reasons why people comply with the law is a task of primary importance 
for legal scholars and policy-makers. This paper contributes to examining the behavioral 
determinants of compliance decisions. We investigate the idea that, apart from self-interested 
utilitarian considerations, advancing the social good can be an important reason for law-
abiding behavior. Specifically, we empirically validate the hypothesis put forward by legal 
scholars that a person’s desire to act as a role model affects the willingness to comply with 
the law. When facing a compliance decision, a role model takes into account “compliance 
externalities”, i.e., the effect of witnessing one’s compliance behavior on the observer’s 
compliance decision. To test this hypothesis, we collect field data to see whether the role 
model hypothesis accounts for real-world observations and we additionally conduct a 
vignette experiment to shed light on the underlying motivations for rule compliance. 
The economic theory of law has a long-standing tradition in understanding deterrence 
and compliance decisions, relying most famously on Becker’s (1968) seminal contribution. 
The deterrence hypothesis rests on the traditional economic approach: private costs and 
benefits determine the compliance decision. In contrast to this rigorous approach, recent 
research expanded the framework and started investigating how elements beyond the strict 
economic paradigm influence compliance. 1  Broadening the analytical framework of 
deterrence research has sparked research about how private incentives interact with other 
aspects of compliance behavior such as social norms (Posner, 1997; Jolls et al. 1998), culture 
(Fisman and Miguel, 2007), crowding-out of deterrence incentives (Heyman and Ariely, 
2004), morality (Zamir and Medina, 2008; Stringham, 2011; Ulen, 2015), self-serving and 
impulsive tendencies (Nagin and Pogarsky, 2003), and emotions  (Khadjavi, 2015). 
Despite this recent interest, compliance externalities remain under-studied. A 
noteworthy exception is the contribution of Shavell (2012). The author elaborates a model of 
compliance in which an individual’s decision depends on canonical self-interested utilitarian 
considerations, and the information available to agents, as well as on the “indirect effects” of 
the decision on others. In particular, Shavell (2012) speculates that the decision to comply is 
influenced by a moral tutelary concern: the witnessing of compliance behavior determines a 
change in the desire of observers to comply or not comply with the law. Therefore, if a 
person has to decide whether to abide by the law and is observed by others and if that person 
thinks that the observer witnessing her compliance decision can alter the observer’s tendency 
to abide by the rules, the likelihood to comply will be affected. To date, this hypothesis has 
not been empirically explored. 
Our study contributes to the literature investigating the determinants of compliance by 
providing empirical evidence that supports Shavell’s proposition. The compliance decision 
in our study regards the very general traffic rule and commonly known obligation to stop at a 
red traffic light. Our idea is that if a person’s decision whether to ignore the red traffic light 
is influenced by the willingness to set a good example and so positively affects others’ 
behavior, she will abide by the law more often when the effects of the decision are greater. 
The effect of setting a good example is the greatest on children, since their behavior is more 
malleable and they are more susceptible to the educational inputs received (Buchsbaum et 
                                                
1 The idea that the well-being of others is a key determinant in compliance decisions has already been advanced 
by classical philosophers and legal theorists. For instance, in Plato’s Crito, Socrates, after being condemned to 
the death penalty, refuses his interlocutor’s offer to let him escape from Athens because of his concerns for the 
city’s well-being: “Do you think it possible for a city not to be destroyed if the verdicts of its courts have no 
force but are nullified and set at naught by private individuals?” (Plato, 2000, p. 54). In more recent years, 
arguments for respecting rules and obligations that are based on social welfare considerations have been 
advanced by Sartorius (1975) and Hare (1976). 
al., 2011; Butler and Markman, 2014). Compared to adults, children may also be less able to 
draw sophisticated inferences from observed compliance behavior. Therefore, if a person 
desires to act as a role model in order to reduce negative compliance externalities, she will 
more often abide by the law in the presence of children. 
We investigate this idea in two steps. First, we collect data on how often cyclists go 
through a red traffic light while simultaneously monitoring whether children are present and 
also keeping track of other circumstances in the environment surrounding the cyclists’ 
decision. We find that, in general, the frequency with which the average cyclist ignores a red 
light is about 68%. The presence of just adults has a negative, small, and marginally 
significant effect on the frequency of traffic rule violations. In contrast, the frequency of 
cyclists not abiding by the traffic rules and ignoring the red light drops sharply to about 10% 
as soon as a child is simultaneously present at the traffic light. 
Second, we conduct a between-subjects vignette experiment to verify whether the 
motives underlying the cyclists’ decision confirm the role model hypothesis. In the vignette 
experiment, participants are confronted with a scenario that captures the essentials of our 
field setting. All scenarios ask the participant to imagine cycling on a bike path and 
approaching a red traffic light that regulates the crossing of cyclists and pedestrians at a 
crossroads. Scenario descriptions only differ in who is simultaneously present at the traffic 
light: (1) nobody else; (2) some adults; (3) some children; (4) some adults and children; or 
(5) parents and their children. We find the same main effect in the vignette study that we 
found in the field. When the scenario only describes the presence of adults the frequency of 
rule violation drops only a little. By contrast, in those scenarios that describe the presence of 
children the frequency of rule-violating choices drops sharply. After making their 
compliance decision, participants assessed the importance of six possible motives underlying 
their decision. Among compliant participants, only one motive was sensitive to the scenario 
manipulations: participants reported a significantly higher desire to act as a role model when 
the scenario described the presence of children. Concerns about legal or social sanctions, the 
desire to conform to other persons’ behavior, safety concerns, or a Kantian motive for rule-
compliance were unaffected by the manipulations. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reports on the data collection in the field and 
the design of the vignette study. Section 3 provides the analysis of the data from both the 
field and the vignette experiment. Section 4 discusses these results and concludes. 
 
 
 
 
2	 Data	
2.1	 Field	data	
Between May and June 2015, we manually collected data at two locations in Hamburg, 
Germany: (1) Friedrichstraße and (2) Fruchtallee. In each of these two locations, there is a 
junction where a cycle path crosses a public road at right angles. The locations are in a 
densely populated area close to the city center and the two cycle paths are used daily by 
thousands of cyclists.2 While our observations in Friedrichstraße concern the crossing of a 
two-way street, our observations in Fruchtallee pertain to a one-way section of the street. We 
control for the difference in locations in our analysis, as crossing at the latter location is 
arguably less risky. 
                                                
2 The Appendix includes a map with the exact coordinates. 
During data collection, the data collectors were sitting on the bench of a bus stop at 
Friedrichstraße and on a bench in the courtyard of a school at Fruchtallee. They had a book 
open in front of them. The spreadsheet to record observations was placed inside the book. 
The data collectors recorded whether cyclists complied with the red traffic light when (1) the 
cyclists were traveling on the bike path, (2) the cyclists confronted a red traffic light (while 
the traffic lights for cars were green), and (3) the cyclists had to cross the road. In this 
situation, cyclists can either abide by the traffic regulation and stop at the red traffic light, 
which entails opportunity costs of time to wait for their traffic light to change to green, or 
decide to break the law and cross the road despite the red signal. 
In order to code an observation as “compliant”, our protocol required that the four 
following conditions should hold simultaneously: 
 
(1a) A cyclist arrives at the crossing approaching from the bike path and stops. 
Observations, when a cyclist did not approach from the bike path, were not 
recorded. 
(2a) The traffic light for cyclists is red and the traffic light regulating car traffic on the 
perpendicular road is green. This signal combination is our window of observation. 
Note that in accordance with German traffic regulations (§ 37 StVO), both car and 
bike traffic lights at the two locations have a red (“stop!”), yellow (“attention!”), 
and green (“move!”) signal and are synchronized such that five different 
combinations of signals (cars-bikes) can occur: (a) red-red; (b) red-yellow; (c) red-
green; (d) yellow-red; (e) green-red. We only collected observations when 
combination (e) was signaled, because combination (e) entails no ambiguity as to 
which traffic party is entitled to move (cars) and which has to stop (cyclists). 
(3a) When signal combination (e) occurs, the road is clear from cars, buses, 
motorbikes, or any other vehicle for at least seven seconds. Like the other 
conditions, this constraint aims at establishing comparability between 
observations.3 
(4a) The cyclist does not cross the road until the bike traffic light becomes green. 
 
In the same way, in order to code an observation as “non-compliant”, our protocol 
relied on the following two variations of (2a) and (4a): 
 
(2b) Signal combination (e) regulates traffic for at least three seconds. This condition 
was intended to ensure that cyclists are aware that they are in a clear violation 
scenario, i.e., the crossing is regulated by signal combination (e) rather than (a) or 
(d). 
(4b) The cyclist crosses the road while the bike traffic light is still red and the car traffic 
light is still green, i.e., while signal combination (e) occurs. Again, ambiguous 
                                                
3 We choose the very conservative threshold of seven seconds in order to avoid possible mistakes in coding a 
cyclist’s behavior as “compliant”. For instance, if a shorter time threshold was used, we could have wrongly 
coded as compliant behavior the cyclist’s failure to cross the red light due to her risk estimation for crossing the 
road when there is approaching traffic. Seven seconds is a time frame, in which arguably even an extremely 
risk-averse individual would find it safe to cross a one-way road. Therefore, we believe, our data rule out this 
possible confound. 
situations (for instance, when the traffic light for cars changes to the yellow signal 
while the traffic light for cyclists still signals red) are not recorded. 
During each iteration of the green-red signal combination we recorded at most one 
observation. If more than one cyclist approached the crossing during any window of 
observation, the behavior of only the first cyclist was recorded. Moreover, if multiple 
cyclists were compliant and non-compliant simultaneously, we dropped the observation. We 
also suspended data collection when other confounding factors were at work, namely: (1) 
when a cyclist was riding and talking on her mobile phone at the same time; (2) when we 
heard sirens of emergency vehicles, e.g., police, firefighters, or ambulances; and (3) when 
people got on or off a bus at Friedrichstraße in the proximity of the crossing. 
For each resulting observation, we recorded the following additional information about 
the cyclists: the location; date and time; the cyclist’s gender. The data collection also 
comprised an estimate of the data collectors about whether the cyclist was older than 50 
years. In the same manner, we recorded whether the cyclists were Caucasian. 
Moreover, we recorded additional information about the situational context. We 
recorded whether adult bystanders and/or children were present who could observe the 
cyclist’s compliance decision.4 We defined “children” as persons with an estimated body 
height of less than 120cm. Taller persons were classified as “adult” bystanders. In order to 
facilitate this classification for those persons close to the threshold height, we attached a red 
poster advertising a concert to the traffic lights at the crossing such that the poster’s lower 
edge lay exactly at 120cm. When we classified a person as child, we additionally recorded 
whether the child was on the same or the opposite side of the street as the cyclist and 
whether the child was alone or accompanied by an adult. In the latter case, we also recorded 
whether the child was able to walk alone as opposed to being carried on a stroller, in a 
child’s bike seat, or in the adult’s arms. 
Two persons collected data during multiple workdays and at different hours of the day 
between 7:00 and 20:00. Observations were recorded by both data collectors working 
contemporaneously in the same location but independently in 6 one-hour sessions during the 
first day of fieldwork. The protocol for validating data collected jointly was as follows. First, 
each person records, for each observation, the cyclist’s compliance decision and situational 
factors. Each individual observation is precisely identified by the exact time it was collected. 
Second, at some regular time intervals the data collectors compare their observations. Third, 
for each observation, only entries regarding compliance decisions and situational factors that 
match in the two data sets are kept. Non-matching entries are coded as missing values. 
During the data collection sessions in which data collectors worked in parallel, they collected 
83 observations each. A comparison of the two sets of data collected independently showed 
that the entries recording whether children were observing and whether a cyclist’s behavior 
was compliant or non-compliant (our main variables of interest) perfectly matched for each 
of these 83 records across the two data collectors.5 In 11 records, the entries recorded by the 
data collectors did not match regarding situational factors or cyclists’ observable 
characteristics (9 of these 11 mis-matches were registered during the first one-hour data 
                                                
4 The data collectors were not asked to speculate whether the children were in fact observing the cyclist or 
whether they were looking in the cyclist’s direction. They were asked to record whether the children were 
present and had the physical possibility to observe the cyclist’s compliance decision (i.e., an infant for whom it 
is physically impossible to see the street because she is lying in an enclosed stroller pushed by an adult, was not 
recorded as a “child present”. 
5 This result was expected, considering that the procedures to establish whether children are present and 
whether a cyclist is compliant are very detailed and specifically designed to minimize the possibility of mis-
interpretation. 
collection session). As mentioned above, disagreements were resolved by recording as 
missing values the entries that did not match. In subsequent data collection sessions, a single 
person working independently collected the data. A 𝜒!-test comparing the compliance rates 
observed in the sample of data collected by a single data collector against the one observed 
in the sample of data collected by the two data collectors working in parallel suggest no 
systematic differences between results obtained using the two procedures (when children are 
present, 𝜒! = 0.002, 𝑝 = 0.96; when no child is present, 𝜒! = 0.08, 𝑝 = 0.78). 
We gathered a total of 445 observations, 79 of which involved cyclists’ compliance 
decisions in the presence of children. 
 
 
2.2	 Vignette	data 
We conducted an additional vignette experiment to gather information of the kind we could 
not record in the field. The vignette experiment consisted of a main and a supplementary 
part. In the main part of the vignette study, the different scenarios in our treatments cover 
situations similar to those we observed in the field. Translated from German, the description 
in the baseline scenario was as follows: 
 
While you are riding your bike on a bike path through the park, you approach a 
perpendicular road. You have to cross the road to continue riding on the bike path 
and arrive at your destination. The crossing of bike path and street is regulated by 
traffic lights. The traffic lights for pedestrians and cyclists have just changed to 
red and the traffic lights for road traffic already show green. 
 
Your view of both directions of the street is not obstructed. Neither cars nor other 
vehicles are close to the crossing. [There are no other people at the pedestrian 
traffic light.] You have a good overview of the surroundings and are absolutely 
certain that no policemen are observing you. 
 
Do you cross the street, although the traffic lights for pedestrians and cyclists are 
still red? Or do you wait until your traffic light changes to green? 
 
Only the bracketed sentence changed across the different scenario descriptions. Instead of 
the bracketed sentence in the baseline scenario (“Alone”), the other four scenarios each 
included one of the following sentences: 
 
At the traffic light on the other side of the road, there are a few pedestrians who 
are looking in your direction. (“Adult”) 
 
At the traffic light on the other side of the road, there are a few children who are 
looking in your direction. (“Child”) 
 
At the traffic light on the other side of the road, there are two children and two 
other adults who are looking in your direction. (“Child & Adult”) 
 
At the traffic light on the other side of the road, there are two children and their 
parents who are looking in your direction. (“Child & Parents”) 
 
To make each scenario more salient, we supported the textual description with a drawing that 
matched each scenario. 6  The vignette experiment was run between-subjects, i.e., each 
participant was exposed to only one scenario. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
scenario. 
In each scenario participants decided to either cross the road immediately or to wait for 
the traffic light to change to green, and then the second stage of the main part asked 
compliant participants to indicate the motives behind the preceding decision. We elicited six 
motives: 
 
(1) concern about a legal sanction (“Even though I am absolutely sure that there are 
no police in sight, I am concerned about being fined. One can never be sure.”); 
(2) Kantian concern (“Crossing the street is forbidden while the traffic light is red. A 
rule is a rule.”); 
(3) concern about a social sanction (“I don’t want my fellow men yelling at me about 
crossing with the traffic light at red.”); 
(4) social influence effect (“When other people wait at the red light, I am willing to 
conform too, even if it is not dangerous to cross.”); 
(5) role-model effect (“I am concerned about how my fellow men perceive me. I don’t 
want to be a bad example.”);7 
(6)  safety concern (“I am concerned that other people move unpredictably and might 
endanger my crossing the street.”). 
For each of these six motives, participants could indicate its weight for their compliance 
decision by adjusting the position of a slider between 0 and 100. In addition, we added an 
open-ended question about which other motives determined the participant’s decision. 
The remaining part of the vignette experiment was independent from the random 
scenario assignment and, thus, identical for all participants. This part aimed at gathering 
individual characteristics that may determine the compliance decision. We elicited 
participants’ domain-specific risk attitudes by employing the respective questions from the 
German socio-demographic panel (SOEP). The seven risk domains covered are “general”, 
“car driving”, “financial matters”, “sports and leisure”, “career”, “health”, and “trust” (cf.: 
Dohmen et al., 2011). For each category, participants could report their risk attitude on a 
seven point Likert-scale between “not at all willing to take risks” and “very much willing to 
take risks”. Likert-scales were coded from -3 to 3. A section concerning basic socio-
demographic characteristics completed the supplementary part of the vignette experiment. 
                                                
6 The Appendix shows all supporting drawings. 
7 As correctly pointed out by an anonymous referee, item 5 contains two possible motivations for compliance 
with the law: the willingness to act as a role-model (a pro-social motive) and also the willingness to produce a 
good impression on others (a more self-interested motive). We acknowledge that both motivations are present 
in item 5, so that this item formulation would not be ideal to measure the self-reported importance of acting as a 
good example. Nevertheless, we also emphasize that the results obtained remain valid since, as we will explain 
in detail in the next section, our analysis does not focus on the self-reported assessment of the importance of the 
role-model effect, but on how the presence of children – that is experimentally varied across scenarios 
otherwise identical – moderates the importance given to this motivation. 
We programmed the vignette experiment in oTree (Chen et al., 2016).8 During March 
2016, we administered the study online through a server of the Max Planck Institute for 
Research on Collective Goods. We recruited participants as follows. In Germany, there are 
“Nett-Werk” groups (which is a wordplay on the German translation for “network”) on 
social network platforms for any given bigger city (like Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, etc.). 
These groups are open and feature up to tens of thousands members. The purpose of these 
groups is to provide support for each other for any kind of requests. We advertised the 
vignette study in “Nett-Werk” groups of major German cities. We invited users to participate 
in an online questionnaire and we provided a link that redirected the participant to the oTree 
server. After completing the registration, each participant was then randomly assigned to one 
of the five scenarios. Altogether, we sampled 309 participants from German-speaking 
countries.9 
 
 
3	 Analysis	&	results	
3.1	 Hypotheses	
According to the role model hypothesis, the willingness to advance the social good by setting 
a good example is an important reason for abiding by the law. In the setting of this paper, the 
presence of children who observe a cyclist’s decision to cross the red traffic light influences 
the compliance rate, since the cyclist wants to act as a role model and children are the most 
receptive to educational inputs. 
We therefore derive two hypotheses: 
 
1. All things being equal, cyclists’ frequency of rule violation (both observed in the 
field data, and self-reported in the vignette experiment) is lower when there are 
children observing the compliance decision. 
2. The weight that compliant respondents in the vignette experiment assign to the 
role-model motive (motive number 5 above) is larger in the scenarios in which 
children are present and observe the compliance decision. 
 
 
3.2	 Analysis	of	the	field	data	
We begin our analysis by comparing the observable characteristics of the group of cyclists 
taking the decision to ignore the red traffic light when children were present against the 
characteristics of those cyclists whose decisions were recorded when no child was observing. 
The results summarized in Table 1 show no statistically significant differences on 
observables between the two groups. We then look at the frequency of cyclists violating the 
traffic rules, contingent on the presence at the traffic light of children, who are observing the 
non-compliant behavior. Figure 1a depicts the frequencies for both cases. While 67.94% of 
cyclists ignored their red traffic light and in contravention of rules crossed the street when 
children were not present, only 10.39% did so when children were present. A 𝜒!-test allows 
us to reject the null hypothesis that observed traffic rule violations and the presence of 
children are independent from each other (𝜒! = 84.202, 𝑝 < 0.001). 
  
                                                
8 The program in German is available upon request. 
9 While the majority of participants were German, we also had some Swiss and Austrian respondents. 
Table	1:	Cyclists’	observable	characteristics	when	(no)	children	are	present	
	 Frequencies	by	Condition	 	
	 Children	Present	 No-children	 Diff	(Pearson	𝜒!)	
male	 0.50	 0.54	 0.58	
caucasian	 0.92	 0.94	 0.59	
old	 0.38	 0.39	 0.83	
Note:	Comparison	of	cyclists’	observable	characteristics	for	whom	compliance	
decisions	were	recorded	in	situations	with	children	present	or	without	children	
present,	for	the	variables	“old”	(𝑛 = 445),	“caucasian”	(𝑛 = 445),	and	“male”	
(𝑛 = 335).	The	right	column	reports	p-values	from	a	Pearson	𝜒!-test.	
 
 
In a regression analysis, we control for other situational variables by estimating the 
effect of children being present on the frequency of non-compliant behavior. All the results 
presented below are estimated with hour-of-the-day fixed effects. Table 2 reports the results 
of estimations with both linear probability models (models 1 and 2) and logistic regression 
models (models 3 and 4). The dependent variable “cross” is a dummy taking value 1 when a 
cyclist does not comply with the law and crosses the red traffic light. The dummy variable 
“children” takes value 1 when a child was present at the traffic light and could observe the 
cyclist’s compliance decision. The dummy variables “old” and “female” refer to observable 
characteristics of the cyclists (compare Section 2.1). Moreover, we control for time with 
variables “morning” and “peak”, which indicate that the observation was collected before 
12:00 noon and during peak traffic hours (7:30 a.m. - 9:00 a.m., 5.30 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.), 
respectively. Finally, the dummy variable “Friedrich” indicates whether the observation was 
collected at location Friedrichstraße. We estimated robust standard errors. 
 
Table	2:	Probability	of	Traffic	Rule	Violations	
	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	
(a)	All	Children	 (b)	Restrained	Children	
Figure	1:	Compliance	Behavior	in	Presence	of	Children	
Note:	The	figure	reports	the	frequency	of	traffic	rule	violation	when	children	are	present	or	not.	
The	panel	includes	the	whole	sample	of	observations.	The	right	panel	includes	only	observations	
where	children	cannot	walk	independently.	
children	 -0.544***	
(0.052)	
-0.540***	
(0.063)	
-0.533***	
(0.062)	
-0.537***	
(0.084)	
other	bystanders	 -0.065	
(0.046)	
-0.062	
(0.051)	
-0.064	
(0.042)	
-0.055	
(0.048)	
old	 	 -0.254***	
(0.052)	
	 -0.226***	
(0.041)	
morning	 	 0.241*	(0.131)	 	
0.480***	
(0.131)	
peak	 	 -0.056	
(0.116)	
	 -0.244**	
(0.098)	
Friedrich	 	 -0.120	(0.084)	 	
-0.132	
(0.083)	
female	 	 -0.116**	
(0.048)	
	 -0.111**	
(0.047)	
(Constant)	 0.960***	
(0.097)	
0.971***	
(0.073)	 	 	
Hour	fixed	effects	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Day	fixed	effects	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
N	 445	 335	 445	 335	
Note:	Dependent	variable:	dummy	“cross”	equal	to	1	when	cyclist	violates	the	traffic	rule.	
Models	1	and	2	report	OLS	regressions,	Models	3	and	4	Logit	regressions,	with	hour	of	the	
day	and	day	fixed	effects.	Robust	standard	errors	are	calculated.	Models	2	and	4	include	
controls	for	observables.	Symbols	***,	**,	and	*	indicate	significance	at	the	1%,	5%,	and	
10%	level,	respectively.	
	
The results confirm that the presence of children has a strong and significant (𝑝 < 0.01) 
negative effect on the probability that a cyclist will go through the traffic light on red.10 This 
result holds for any model specification, whether we include controls or not.11 
A possibly confounding factor for the identification of a role-model effect may be that 
cyclists become much more careful when a child is around because they fear that an 
incautious child might behave and move in an unexpected manner. If the cyclists are 
concerned about children behaving unpredictably, their sensitivity towards the children’s 
presence at the traffic light would be caused for reasons other than being a role model.12 We 
avoid this concern by looking at the presence of only those children who are kept under the 
physical control of an adult, i.e., they are not walking independently. Rather, these children 
are carried in a stroller, in a child’s bike seat, or in the adult’s arms. Therefore, these 
                                                
10 We also collected the dummy variable “front” that controls for the child being at the opposite side of the road, 
the dummy variable “adults” that registers whether at least one adult is present, and the dummy “caucasian” 
that refers to the cyclists’ race. In a more refined regression model, we included the dummy “caucasian” and we 
estimated whether compliance varies between situations where children are waiting alone at the traffic light or 
an adult accompanies them. The estimated increase in compliance is not statistically different in the two 
situations (results available upon request). 
11 Note that we lose 110 observations once we include all controls. The majority of this loss of observations is 
due to the inability to record a per se observable characteristic because the cyclist crossed the street very 
quickly. Moreover, in a few cases the characteristic was not coded alike when the data collectors worked 
contemporaneously in the same location. When observations conflicted, we coded the characteristic as missing 
value. 
12  We are grateful to Marco Casari, Ben Depoorter, and Luigi Franzoni for suggesting this alternative 
explanation. 
restrained children are unable to engage in unexpected, dangerous actions that cyclists may 
be concerned about. 
 
Table	3:	Probability	of	Traffic	Rule	Violations	–	Children	not	Walking	Independently	
	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	
children	 -0.490***	
(0.072)	
-0.505***	
(0.082)	
-0.479***	
(0.085)	
-0.496***	
(0.113)	
other	bystanders	 -0.071	
(0.052)	
-0.054	
(0.055)	
-0.069	
(0.048)	
-0.053	
(0.051)	
old	 	 -0.261***	
(0.055)	
	 -0.235***	
(0.043)	
morning	 	 0.438***	(0.122)	 	
0.492***	
(0.138)	
peak	 	 -0.252**	
(0.110)	
	 -0.240***	
(0.106)	
Friedrich	 	 -0.123	(0.090)	 	
-0.136	
(0.090)	
female	 	 -0.111**	
(0.050)	
	 -0.110**	
(0.050)	
(Constant)	 0.990***	
(0.120)	
0.970***	
(0.076)	 	 	
Hour	fixed	effects	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Day	fixed	effects	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
N	 378	 315	 378	 315	
Note:	Dependent	variable:	dummy	“cross”	equal	to	1	when	cyclist	violates	the	traffic	rule.	
The	sample	includes	only	observations	where	children	are	not	walking	independently,	but	
are	 somehow	 restrained.	Models	 1	 and	 2	 report	 OLS	 regressions,	Models	 3	 and	 4	 Logit	
regressions,	 with	 hour	 of	 the	 day	 and	 day	 fixed	 effects.	 Robust	 standard	 errors	 are	
calculated.	 Models	 2	 and	 4	 include	 controls	 for	 observables.	 Symbols	 ***,	 **,	 and	 *	
indicate	significance	at	the	1%,	5%,	and	10%	level,	respectively.	
 
Figure 1b illustrates the frequencies of compliance decisions contingent on children 
being present, but excluding those observations where children were walking independently. 
The pattern remains nearly unchanged. While 68.31% of cyclists ignored the red light when 
children were not present, only 14.58% did so when restrained children were present. Again, 
based on a 𝜒!-test we reject the null hypothesis that observed traffic right violations and the 
presence of children are independent from each other (𝜒! = 49.767, 𝑝 < 0.001). As before, 
we control for other situational variables. Correspondingly, Table 3 reports the results of 
estimations with both linear probability models (models 1 and 2) and logistic regression 
models (models 3 and 4). For any model specification, the results confirm that the presence 
of children, even when restrained, has a strong and significant (𝑝 < 0.01) negative effect on 
the probability that a cyclist ignores the red traffic light.13 
                                                
13 As suggested by an anonymous referee, another way to rule out this confounding factor is to examine what 
happens when only children are present, who are on the other side of the street at the moment when the cyclists 
are making their decision to comply or not. In these situations, the danger, which children might present by 
A second possibly confounding factor might be audience size. Indeed, it is possible that 
children tend to assemble at traffic lights at particular time of the day when many other 
people are also waiting to cross the street. Should that be the case, it is possible that cyclists 
become more cautious in crossing the red traffic light because of the crowd waiting there, 
irrespective of the bystanders being children. To rule out this possibly confounding factor, in 
Table 4 we replicate the same regression reported in Table 2 excluding all the observations 
where, apart from children and eventually the person accompanying them, other bystanders 
are present at the traffic intersection.14 Once again, results remain qualitatively the same and 
the point estimates are also very similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3, suggesting that 
the observed increase in compliance is not driven by audience size effects. 
 
 
Table	4:	Probability	of	Traffic	Rule	Violations	–	No	Bystander	Except	for	Children	and	their	
Accompanying	Person	
	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	
children	 -0.550***	
(0.089)	
-0.556***	
(0.098)	
-0.504***	
(0.087)	
-0.498***	
(0.100)	
old	 	 -0.288***	
(0.069)	
	 -0.256***	
(0.051)	
morning	 	 0.119	(0.160)	 	
0.268	
(0.171)	
peak	 	 -0.034	(0.153)	 	
-0.139	
(0.141)	
Friedrich	 	 -0.043	
(0.106)	
	 -0.054	
(0.101)	
female	 	 -0.011	(0.062)	 	
-0.009	
(0.061)	
(Constant)	 0.999***	
(0.121)	
0.921***	
(0.091)	
	 	
Hour	fixed	effects	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Day	fixed	effects	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
N	 261	 212	 261	 212	
Note:	Dependent	variable:	dummy	“cross”	equal	to	1	when	cyclist	violates	the	traffic	rule.	
The	sample	includes	only	observations	when	no	other	bystander	is	present	but	for	the	
observing	children	and	the	accompanying	parent.	Models	1	and	2	report	OLS	regressions,	
Models	3	and	4	Logit	regressions,	with	hour	of	the	day	and	day	fixed	effects.	Robust	
standard	errors	are	calculated.	Models	2	and	4	include	controls	for	observables.	Symbols	
***,	**,	and	*	indicate	significance	at	the	1%,	5%,	and	10%	level,	respectively.	
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
making unanticipated movements, would be considerably reduced because there is more time for everyone to 
react. We replicate the same regression models proposed in Table 2 but considering only this restricted sample. 
Results reported in Table 8 in the Appendix are qualitatively the same, confirming the main findings. 
14 We only recorded a dummy coded 1 if at least one other individual in addition to the children and their 
accompanying person, was waiting at the crossroads; otherwise a zero was recorded. However, we cannot 
estimate the effect of the size of the audience, since, apart from the aforementioned dummy, we did not collect 
data on the number of bystanders observing the compliance decision. 
3.3	 Analysis	of	the	vignette	experiment 
We now turn to the results of our vignette experiment. Figure 2 depicts the frequencies 
of non-compliant decisions across all treatments. Descriptively, these results are in line with 
the field data. The frequency of non-compliant decisions is much lower when the presence of 
a child was described than when a child was not present in the description: in the “Alone” 
and “Adult” scenarios, the frequency of rule-violating decisions was 68.3% and 29.8%, 
respectively; in the “Child”, “Child & Adult”, and “Child & Parents” scenarios, the 
frequency of non-compliant decisions was 0%, 7.8%, and 4.3%, respectively. In comparison 
to the results from the field, there is one significant difference. In the vignette experiment, 
the presence of an adult observer reduces the frequency of non-compliant decisions from 
68.3% in the “Alone” scenario to 29.8% in the “Adult” scenario. In data from the field, the 
frequency of jumping the red light is much less reduced when only an adult is present and 
this reduction is only weakly significant. 
After conducting a 𝜒!-test, we reject the null hypothesis that the compliance decision is 
independent from the treatments (𝜒! = 113.05, 𝑝 < 0.001). Among the treatments that 
describe the presence of children (“Child”, “Child & Adult”, “Child & Parents”), however, 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (𝜒! = 1.98 , 𝑝 = 0.372 ). If we compare the 
compliance rate in the treatment where children are alone (“Child”) against the joint sample 
of treatments where children are accompanied by adults (“Child & Adult” plus “Child & 
Parents”), the difference is not statistically significant (𝜒! = 2.70, 𝑝 = 0.10). Thus we 
Figure	2:	Frequency	of	Traffic	Rule	Violation	by	Treatment	
Note:	Frequency	of	traffic	rule	violation	in	the	vignette	experiment.	The	five	
categories	refer	to	the	scenarios	to	which	participants	were	randomly	allocated.	
From	left	to	right:	“Alone”	indicates	no	bystanders	are	present,	“Adult”	indicates	
the	presence	of	adult	bystanders,	“Child”	indicates	the	presence	of	just	children,	
“Child+Adult”	indicates	the	presence	of	children	and	adult	bystanders,	
“Child+Parents”	indicates	the	presence	of	children	with	parents.	
cannot conclude that compliance decisions are independent in these treatments. Therefore, 
we pull together observations from treatments that describe the presence of children 
(“Child”, “Child & Adult”, “Child & Parents”, treated onward) on the one hand and those 
from treatments that do not (“Alone”, “Adult”, control onward) on the other hand. We test 
whether the proportion of non-compliant choices is lower when children are present than 
when they are not. A one-sided two-sample test of proportions leads us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the proportion of non-compliant choices is equal to or larger when children 
are present than when they are not (𝜒! = 84.018, 𝑝 < 0.001). In line with our results from 
the field, we conclude that the presence of children substantially bolsters rule-compliant 
behavior in the vignette experiment. 
After conducting a 𝜒!-test, we reject the null hypothesis that the compliance decision is 
independent from the treatments (𝜒! = 113.05, 𝑝 < 0.001). Among the treatments that 
describe the presence of children (“Child”, “Child & Adult”, “Child & Parents”), however, 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (𝜒! = 1.98 , 𝑝 = 0.372 ). If we compare the 
compliance rate in the treatment where children are alone (“Child”) against the joint sample 
of treatments where children are accompanied by adults (“Child & Adult” plus “Child & 
Parents”), the difference is not statistically significant (𝜒! = 2.70, 𝑝 = 0.10). Thus we 
cannot conclude that compliance decisions are independent in these treatments. Therefore, 
we pull together observations from treatments that describe the presence of children 
(“Child”, “Child & Adult”, “Child & Parents”, treated onward) on the one hand and those 
from treatments that do not (“Alone”, “Adult”, control onward) on the other hand. We test 
whether the proportion of non-compliant choices is lower when children are present than 
when they are not. A one-sided two-sample test of proportions leads us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the proportion of non-compliant choices is equal to or larger when children 
are present than when they are not (𝜒! = 84.018, 𝑝 < 0.001). In line with our results from 
the field, we conclude that the presence of children substantially bolsters rule-compliant 
behavior in the vignette experiment. 
We then investigate the motivations behind stopping more often when children are 
present. In Table 5 we report the results of a Logit regression in which the likelihood of 
violating the law is regressed on the six motives described above. We interact each motive 
with the dummy “children”, which takes the value one in the scenarios where children are 
present. In comparison to Model 1, Model 2 additionally includes controls for gender, age, 
and participants’ risk aversion. The interaction term “children × role model” is negative and 
significantly different from zero at 5% level. This result suggests that, holding constant the 
willingness to act as role model, the presence of children significantly reduces the likelihood 
of crossing when the traffic light is red, and breaking the law. None of the interaction terms 
between the dummy “children” and any of the other motives are statistically and 
significantly different from zero at the conventional level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table	5:	Likelihood	to	Violate	the	Law	and	Self-reported	Motives	for	
Compliance	
	 Model	1	 Model	2	
children	 -1.376	
(0.971)	
-1.535	
(0.990)	
role	model	 0.028**	
(0.013)	
0.027**	
(0,013)	
children	×	role	model	 -0.035**	
(0.017)	
-0.035**	
(0.017)	
legal	sanction	 0.015*	
(0.009)	
0.015	
(0.009)	
children	×	legal	sanction	 0.024	
(0.018)	
0.024	
(0.018)	
Kantian	concern	 -0.019**	
(0.009)	
-0.019**	
(0.009)	
children	×	Kantian	concern	 0.002	
(0.017)	
0.004	
(0.018)	
social	sanction	 0.051***	
(0.012)	
0.052***	
(0.012)	
children	×	social	sanction	 -0.032*	
(0.017)	
-0.031*	
(0.017)	
social	influence	 -0.034**	
(0.014)	
-0.033**	
(0.014)	
children	×	social	influence	 0.023	
(0.019)	
0.021	
(0.020)	
safety	concern	 0.020**	
(0.008)	
0.019**	
(0.009)	
children	×	safety	concern	 0.001	
(0.015)	
0.002	
(0.015)	
age	 	 0.005	
(0.028)	
female	 	 0.993*	
(0.511)	
risk	 	 0.073	
(0.115)	
(Constant)	 -1.458**	
(0.620)	
-2.178*	
(1.136)	
N	 309	 309	
Note:	Dependent	variable:	dummy	“cross”	equal	to	1	when	cyclist	
chooses	to	violate	the	law	in	the	vignette	experiment.	Logistic	
regressions.	In	comparison	to	Model	1,	Model	2	additionally	includes	
controls	for	age,	gender,	and	risk	attitude.	Symbols	***,	**,	and	*	
indicate	significance	at	the	1%,	5%,	and	10%	level,	respectively.	
 
We proceed by focusing on participants who self-reported to be compliant with the law 
and thus would stop at the red light. We examine the results regarding self-reported motives 
underlying their decision. Figure 3 depicts the average of the self-reported motives for 
compliance with the law in treated and control groups. From the six motives that we elicited, 
only the mean weight of the role-model motive clearly exhibits an upward shift in the three 
treatments describing the presence of a child. A two-sided t-test comparing the means of the 
role model motive between groups reports that the difference is significant at the 
conventional level (𝑡 = 2.36 , 𝑝 = 0.018). We find no significant differences between 
treatments with and without children observing for the other five motives. 
This result is confirmed by a multi-variate regression. Conditional on reporting the 
decision to stop at the red traffic light, the six motives enter the analysis as a matrix of 
response variables. To establish comparability with the field data, we again merge the 
treatments describing the presence of children and those that do not. The resulting dummy 
variable enters as predictor variable.15 Participants’ gender, age, and self-reported measure for 
general risk taking enter as control variables.16 Table 6 reports the results. The presence of 
children in the treatments has a positive and significant effect on the motive to be a role 
                                                
15 We also run a separate multi-variate regression model in which we isolate the effects of the treatment “Child”, 
in which children are waiting alone at the traffic light, from the treatments “Child & Adult” plus “Child & 
Parents”, in which children are accompanied by adults. As it was the case for the compliance decisions in 
observational data and for the self-reported compliance rate in the survey experiment, the results are 
statistically the same for the two sub-samples of treatments. 
16 In a series of robustness checks, we verified that the exclusion of the controls does not affect the results. 
Note:	Self-reported	motives	for	compliance	with	the	traffic	rule	on	a	0-100	scale.	The	
blue	bar	includes	situations	where	no	children	are	present	in	the	scenario.	The	red	
bar	includes	situations	where	children	are	observing.	
Figure	3:	Average	Motive	Weights	for	Compliant	Choices	
model (𝑝 = 0.031). Otherwise, however, the presence of children has no effect on the 
motive weights of compliant participants. 
 
 
Table	6:	Motive	Weights	of	Compliant	Participants	–	Effect	of	Children	Presence	
	 Motive	1:	
Legal	sanction	
Motive	2:	
Kantian	
concern	
Motive	3:	
Social	sanction	
Motive	4:	
Social	influence	
Motive	5:	
Role	model	
Motive	6:	
Safety	concern	
children	 -0.482	
(3.81)	
-6.404	
(5.82)	
2.250	
(5.05)	
-3.756	
(5.57)	
13.318**	
(5.38)	
2.184	
(5.83)	
age	 -0.514***	
(0.18)	
0.167	
(0.28)	
-0.395	
(0.25)	
0.399	
(0.27)	
-0.118	
(0.26)	
-0.181	
(0.28)	
female	 -3.506	
(3.83)	
-4.670	
(5.85)	
2.969	
(5.08)	
-11.207**	
(5.60)	
7.663	
(5.40)	
-9.212	
(5.86)	
risk	attitide	 -1.841***	
(0.71)	
-5.039***	
(1.08)	
-3.614***	
(0.94)	
-4.930***	
(1.03)	
-5.919***	
(1.00)	
-4.685***	
(1.08)	
(Constant)	 31.479***	
(5.63)	
65.369***	
(8.61)	
45.418***	
(7.47)	
66.871***	
(8.24)	
76.710***	
(7.95)	
67.991***	
(8.62)	
N	 240	 240	 240	 240	 240	 240	
R2	 0.060	 0.093	 0.070	 0.112	 0.158	 0.084	
Note:	Multivariate	regression,	the	six	motives	enter	the	analysis	as	a	matrix	of	response	variables.	Age,	gender,	
and	risk	attitude	serve	as	additional	controls.	Symbols	***,	**,	and	*	indicate	significance	at	the	1%,	5%,	and	
10%	level,	respectively.	
 
 
As additional evidence supporting our hypothesis that the willingness to act as a role 
model is the leading motivation driving compliance when children are present, we replicate 
the multi-variate regression model presented in Table 6, but focus on the self-reported 
motivations for complying with the law expressed by participants in the treatment “Adult” 
(where only adults bystanders are observing). We compare those motivations with the ones 
reported in the “Alone” treatment where nobody is present at the crossroads. The results are 
reported in Table 7. The only motive for compliance significantly different from zero at the 
conventional level is the concern for social sanctions (i.e. “I don’t want my fellow men 
yelling at me about crossing the red light.”). The coefficient of the role model motive is not 
statistically different from zero and, if anything, the point estimate is negative. This result 
provides further support to our claim that, in presence of children who are considered highly 
receptive to educational inputs, the role model effect is an important factor shaping people’s 
willingness to abide by the law. Conversely, this driver of compliance loses importance 
when compliance decisions are observed by adults, whose identity is arguably less malleable 
and less subject to the influence of their peers’ example. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table	7:	Motive	Weights	of	Compliant	Participants	–	Effect	of	Adults	Presence	
	 Motive	1:	
Legal	sanction	
Motive	2:	
Kantian	
concern	
Motive	3:	
Social	
sanction	
Motive	4:	
Social	
influence	
Motive	5:	
Role	model	
Motive	6:	
Safety	
concern	
adult	 -4.886	
(6.81)	
-2.972	
(10.39)	
17.170**	
(8.36)	
-15.976*	
(9.19)	
11.694	
(9.42)	
11.520	
(9.21)	
controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
(Constant)	 47.725***	
(10.44)	
81.847***	
(15.92)	
49.035***	
(12.82)	
96.592***	
(14.09)	
99.050***	
(14.44)	
100.886***	
(14.12)	
N	 60	 60	 60	 60	 60	 60	
R2	 0.32	 0.34	 0.31	 0.21	 0.17	 0.18	
Note:	Multivariate	regression,	the	six	motives	enter	the	analysis	as	a	matrix	of	response	variables.	
Controls	include	age,	gender,	and	risk	attitude.	Symbols	***,	**,	and	*	indicate	significance	at	the	1%,	
5%,	and	10%	level,	respectively.	
 
 
4	 Discussion	and	conclusion 
In economic analysis of the law, the traditional approach to deter socially undesirable 
behavior consists of providing monetary incentives and imposing external constraints 
through contract, law, or regulation. Research streams in behavioral law and economics have 
elaborated the role of decentralized enforcement and the importance of social and 
psychological costs for deterrence, i.e., the importance of social norms and internal 
constraints in redirecting individual decisions. Our paper contributes to this line of 
reasoning. We provide evidence that agents’ decisions to comply with the law are influenced 
by the desire to act as a role model and so advance the social good in avoiding negative 
compliance externalities. 
We look at cyclists’ compliance decisions regarding the well-known traffic rule that one 
should stop at a red traffic light. If cyclists care about being a role model when deciding 
whether to comply with the traffic rule or not, the prediction is that compliant behavior will 
occur more often when children are observing, because one expects the consequences of 
educational inputs to have the highest influence at a young age. In the field, we find that the 
presence of children has a significant effect on the decision to comply with traffic rules: 
cyclists ignore the red traffic light much less frequently when children are observing them. 
The compliance decisions in our vignette experiment display similar results. When asked 
about the motivation behind the (non-)compliance decision, only the importance of the role-
model effect stands out among the respondents’ stated motivations for compliance in the 
presence of children. 
These findings contribute to the law and economics literature on compliance behavior 
by providing empirical evidence of the hypothesis that compliance externalities are an 
important determinant of the decision to abide by rules. Some scholars argue that the 
outstanding degree of pro-sociality that characterizes humans in the animal world is the 
byproduct of a unique ability to learn (Cushman, 2013). The evidence reported in this paper 
shows that decision-makers anticipate the pedagogical value of setting a good example and 
that their actions are guided by the willingness to foster pro-social behavior. 
Our results also relate to the law and economics literature on social norms. According to 
this line of research, pro-social behavior is not the outcome produced by well-defined and 
stable preferences over payoff distributions, but rather by preferences for following known 
social rules. These social rules specify the most socially appropriate action for the decision 
maker given a set of circumstances. When the decision maker evaluates a possible action, 
she compares it to an external, socially defined normative standard, and judges her own 
behavior according to its conformity to this norm.17 To the extent that the norm is pro-social, 
a person who suffers more from violating norms will behave more pro-socially. In this sense, 
“norms make preferences social” (Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016, p. 3). 
In the decision situation, which characterizes the society we study, acting as a role 
model in order to educate children regarding compliance with rules is a shared social value. 
Hence, individuals are willing to incur a cost, in our case the cost of “teaching by 
demonstration” (Ho et al., 2016) through complying with the law and waiting at a red traffic 
light, in order to display the prescribed behavior. If the outcomes of compliance decisions 
are to some extent the results of socially defined standards, lawmakers possess valuable tools 
for shaping compliance behavior. For instance, it has been suggested that the law can create 
focal points to emphasize pro-social norms of compliance (McAdams, 1997). Lawmakers 
can also promote norm campaigns that raise people’s awareness regarding compliance with 
selected social issues (Cooter, 1998; Posner, 2000; Benabou and Tirole, 2011). As a final 
example, lawmakers can award ex-post prizes and recognition that encourage pro-social 
actions carried out by “norm entrepreneurs” (Sunstein, 1996; Bruni and Sugden, 2013). 
A limitation of this paper is that results of the vignette study might be subjected to 
methodological issues characterizing self-reported data. Indeed, while not directly related to 
our research question, the observed discrepancy in compliance rates for cases in which an 
adult bystander is present between the (not incentivized) self-reported likelihood of stopping 
at the red light in the hypothetical situation of the survey and the (costly) observed 
compliance decision in the field more generally casts doubts about the reliability of the data. 
It is possible that a demand effect inflated participants’ self-reported compliance intentions 
in situations where another adult is observing, while in reality the presence of an adult 
bystander has a much smaller effect on being law-abiding. 
We acknowledge that demand effects are in general an issue for the reliability of self-
reported data. On the other hand, we believe that our research design partly mitigates these 
concerns. First, we implemented an experimental survey based on a between-subject design 
in which we tried to minimize differences in wording among treatments (i.e. only the 
vignette that graphically represented the situation, and the few words referring to it, differed 
among scenarios). Any other element of the procedure was kept identical for each 
participant, including the large majority of words used for describing the scenario and the 
order of questions. Therefore, while we cannot exclude that in general demand effects 
influenced the results of the vignette study, we believe that by comparing the self-reported 
answers of participants exposed to exactly the same procedures and wording, except for a 
graphical element and its description, we have reduced to some extent concerns regarding 
this issue. Second, if we exclude the case in which a bystander alone was present, self-
reported data on compliance are strikingly similar to observed data in the field. The sharp 
increase in compliance in situations where children are present is registered both for self-
reported and observed choices. This finding again makes us more confident about the 
reliability of the results of the vignette study. 
A second limitation of our work is that data from the field study are gathered in a 
specific location of one German city. Further research is needed to identify socio-
demographic contexts where our results hold, and to understand to what extent they can be 
generalized to other cultures and societies. 
                                                
17 This idea can be modeled with a simple utility function in which deviations from norms generate a utility cost. 
Moreover, our study is silent regarding the role model effect on agents’ decisions to 
violate more serious rules and regulations, such as engaging in robbery, tax evasion or other 
criminal activities. We agree that it is plausible that the role model effect vanishes in these 
and other similar contexts (but still has to be proved). Nonetheless, we also believe that 
perceiving themselves as a role model can influence many day-to-day decisions which are 
characterized by risks of important economic consequences, such as speeding, re-cycling, 
consuming energy, free-riding on public transport, or littering. 
Future research will need to investigate whether the role model effect is relevant in 
situations in which deterrence is actually present and relevant. Moreover, researchers will 
have to isolate the psychological mechanisms underlying compliance decisions in the 
presence of compliance externalities. 
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Appendix	A: 
The map shows the two locations in Hamburg at which the data of the field study were 
collected. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure	4:	Locations	where	Field	Data	were	gathered	(Hamburg,	Germany)	
Appendix	B: 
The following five figure shows the illustrations that augmented the scenario descriptions in 
the vignette experiment. Scenario illustrations are courtesy of Lien Debrouwere (www.elle-
dee.be). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(a)	Scenario:	“Alone”	 (b)	Scenario:	“Adult”	
(d)	Scenario:	“Child	&	Adult”	(c)	Scenario:	“Child”	
(e)	Scenario:	“Child	&	Parents”	
Figure	5:	Scenario	Illustrations	in	the	Vignette	Experiment	
 
Appendix	C 
 
Table	8:	Probability	of	Traffic	Rule	Violations	
	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	
children	 -0.541***	
(0.084)	
-0.499***	
(0.106)	
-0.597***	
(0.147)	
-0.544***	
(0.197)	
old	 	 -0.256***	(0.056)	 	
-0.232***	
(0.043)	
morning	 	 0.458***	(0.131)	 	
0.528***	
(0.148)	
peak	 	 -0.238**	
(0.119)	
	 -0.220**	
(0.106)	
Friedrich	 	 -0.160*	(0.094)	 	
-0.162*	
(0.092)	
female	 	 -0.122**	
(0.050)	
	 -0.121**	
(0.050)	
(Constant)	 0.954***	
(0.102)	
0.942***	
(0.073)	 	 	
Hour	fixed	effects	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Day	fixed	effects	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
N	 391	 307	 391	 307	
Note:	Dependent	variable:	dummy	“cross”	equal	to	1	when	cyclist	violates	the	traffic	rule.	
The	 sample	 excludes	 observations	where	 observing	 children	 and	 cyclists	 engaging	 in	 the	
compliance	 decisions	 are	 on	 the	 same	 side	 of	 the	 street.	 Models	 1	 and	 2	 report	 OLS	
regressions,	Models	3	and	4	Logit	regressions,	with	hour	of	the	day	and	day	fixed	effects.	
Robust	 standard	 errors	 are	 calculated.	Models	 2	 and	 4	 include	 controls	 for	 observables.	
Symbols	***,	**,	and	*	indicate	significance	at	the	1%,	5%,	and	10%	level,	respectively.	
 
 
